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Abstract
In recent years, the industrial cluster Engineering has been considered as the most remarkably successful pattern of 
regional economy development. As a result, its evolution has given rise to intensive discussions among scholars. 
Though the present views on its evolution are still in vast disagreement, this paper tries to clarify the inner nature of 
industrial clusters by arguing that the industrial cluster is a kind of inherently complex phenomenon with multi-
agents with certain intelligence interacting each other locally. This paper points out that it is these local adaptive 
interactions among firms that underlie industrial cluster’s movement and evolution. This paper simulates and 
verifies the evolution process and concludes that geographical proximity is the prerequisite for industrial cluster’s
evolution. However, there are some inner constraints, which imply that some coordination mechanisms, such as 
social bonding,  governmental intervention are in some cases the indispensable factors that are critical for the 
successful evolution of an industrial cluster.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The fact that industrial clusters, a prevailing economic phenomenon determined by the local factors, grow rapidly 
in the global competition, has aroused worldwide attention. It is generally agreed that industrial clusters are a group 
of closely related businesses or organizations and their economic behavior and activities tend to be beyond the scope 
of man-made or administrative geographical division and act as a system of its own(Porter, 1990), by means of local 
factors to compete in the global market (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999).
Through the meta cases studies, we find that the occurence of industrial clusters prevails across almost all 
industries, and develop with obvious stages. It may include the emerging high-tech industrial clusters (Saxenian, 
1994) and the traditional ones which have existed over a century(Brenner and Gildner, 2006). Surviving the initial 
phase, industrial clusters may prosper with their unique competitive advantages extended. In other circumstance 
instead, it may fall into stagnation due to the “lock-in” effect (Grabher, 1993).
Until now, the questions about what the nature of the industrial cluster is, when currently it is already a well-
known, though notoriously ambiguous, term thanks to the introduction of a large number of case studies, and what 
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the conditions and constraints on its evolution are, are far less answered.
In recent literature, there is a tendency that researchers are inclined to take industrial clusters as a kind of 
complex adaptive system(CAS), which is formed through interactions by a large number of individual firms (Arthur, 
DeFillippi and Lindsay, 2001). They believed that knowledge flows between the various components within the 
system and the links to external environment, enhanced innovation and enterprise within the group, and finally 
pushed cluster’s evolution.
From perspective of CAS, one firm within cluster continuously adjusts its behaviors and strategy relating to other 
firms around based on results of their previous interactions, in order to better adapt to the surrounding external 
environment. As a consequence, the adaptive behaviors of a large number of firms within specific locale cause the 
emergence and evolution of the industrial cluster as one of the most significant features of the regional economy.
Following this line, this paper endeavors to unravel the evolution of the industrial cluster by identifying the 
conditions and constraints that are captured from CAS perspective. The structure is organized as follows. In Section 
2, the methodology is introduced and simulation approach is discussed. In Section 3, we propose a group gaming 
model on the platform of Swarm 2.2 for Java to simulate the evolution of industrial clusters. In Section 4, the 
programming results are presented and discussed. In section 5 we conclude with some suggestions.
2. Methodology
It must be particularly noted that the firms comprising industrial clusters have the abilities to make decisions 
independently, and each of them can modify their own behaviors according to its previous experience and the local 
environment. The firm also possesses the capability of learning from and imitating the behaviors of others through 
interacting with them. Therefor the situations here are related to many independent firms, each of which can change 
its behaviors on its own right, and the interactions between those self-reliant agents. The number of firms and the 
intelligence involved in the evolution of an industrial cluster add much uncertainty to the ultimate results of its 
development, and produce great complexity which frustrated most of scholars in traditional scientific fields.
Thus the proper approaches to be applied in investigating the evolution of the industrial cluster have to recognize 
these characteristics, i.e., the group of agents and their interactions. Taking these ideas into account, this paper 
adopts a group gaming model, in which every agent in it can adjust its behaviors by its own observation and
judgments, and the interactions between firms are described as a gaming procedure.
With the help of swarm simulation technique, we can design the experiments to simulate the evolutionary process 
of an industrial cluster, then test the conditions that are critical to the evolution, without the cost of neglecting, 
deliberately or unconsciously, the source of complexity permeated in the evolution of an industrial cluster.
3. Multi-agents gaming simulation
3.1. Problem Description
There are many firms with different action strategies in a specific region. The firm is usually possessed with 
myopia because of its bounded rationality, so it can make contacts and interactions only with those located nearby, 
and the firm can only learn the strategy of its partners from their historical experience. The purpose of their 
behaviors is simply to make their gains as large as possible, in this way to survive the market competition. But due 
to limited rationality and imperfect information, firms can only choose interacting actors in bounded spatial scope, 
and can never be certain about the counterpart’s current behaviors. Thus, the evolution process of industrial clusters 
is filled with uncertainties.
In this model, the only difference between firms in question lies on their strategies available for their behaviors. 
The initial profits of all firms are the same. It is also presumed that the interactions between firms are costless. The 
game payoffs of the interaction between firms are determined by factors in outside environment. The payoff matrix 
belongs to “Prisoner’s Dilemma” type, that is, mutual cooperation can bring greater benefits to both sides, but either 
side has the incentive to take speculative behaviors because of incomplete information. As a result, a single time 
game is easy to be locked in the inefficient state. This payoff matrix is so designed in order to reflect the awkward 
situations commonly met in the real business world.
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In the process of group gaming, a kind of “learning” or “imitating” mechanism may occur. When a firm finds 
someone of its neighbors achieves a higher profit than itself, it may learn from or just simply imitate its neighbor’s
strategy. In this model, the modification of strategy by a firm needs no costs as well.
By learning and imitating, the strategy that is beneficial to profit accumulation may spread among firms, and thus 
the successful firm can influence the behaviors of the remote firms who have no direct contacts with it. This kind of 
mechanism may cause the agglomeration of the firms with similar strategy.
In simulation, the evolution of industrial clusters is set to happen in a M × N two-dimensional plane space, where 
M and N are any positive integer, representing the size of rows and columns of the flat space. Any point in this two-
dimensional space can be placed a firm, whose location coordinates is (m, n). Here m, n are positive integers, i.e., m
∈[0, M], n∈[0, N].
For theoretical simplicity, the space is set homogeneous, and there is no difference between any two points in 
absolute sense. However, the neighborhood indicates the geographical proximity.
3.2. Setups for firms’ strategies
In this simulation experiment, firms can only choose two kinds of behaviors, namely “cooperation” and 
“competition”. Therefore, the behavior set for a firm’s choice is {cooperation, competition}.
For wise choice of behaviors, firms need strategies. We assume that there are only two very simple strategies 
available, namely, "a tit for tat" strategy and "always competitive" strategy, respectively. The “tit for tat” strategy 
means that the firm always repeats the same behavior its opponent takes in the last run of the game. The “always 
competitive” strategy means that the firm adopting this strategy would always take competitive behavior, no matter 
what the other party actually takes.
Firms with different strategies are distributed over the space randomly with a distribution density p, here 0<p<1, 
and the distribution density of firms with “always competitive” strategy is 1-p. When p is set to 0.1, then the 
distribution map of firms with “tit for tat” strategy in space is as figure 1 indicates. 
Notes: black points denote firms with “tit for tat” strategy, white points the firms with “always competitive” strategy.
Figure 1 Map of firms with “tit for tat” strategy (p=0.1)
In every turn a firm can receive some returns by interacting with other firms that have direct contact with it. With 
the game repeatedly goes on, the profit of each firm is accumulated. After a certain gaming time, interacting firms 
can adjust their strategies according to the previous gaming results, so as to better adapt to environment. Firms can 
learn from their neighbors by observing the total profit of their counterparts and imitating the strategy of the most 
successful one of them. If the firm in question has the highest profit, it will keep its own strategy. In this way a
firm’s learning and imitating capacities are simulated.
Of course it is of necessity to configure the payoffs of the gaming, which are described in the following payoff 
matrix.
Table 1. Game Payoff Matrix between firms
Cooperation Competition
cooperation
               CC
CC
          BC
CB
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competition
              CB
BC
              BB
BB
In table 1, variable CC in payoff matrix denotes return received when both parties take the actions of 
“cooperation”, while variable CB represents the return received by the cooperative party when one is cooperative 
and the other is competitive, while BC denotes the other party’s return. The variable BB denotes the return when 
both parties are competitive.
Other variables and their values are listed in table 2.
Table 2. value setup in simulation
Variable Initial value Variable Initial value
M 100 CC 4
N 50 CB -1
Agent profit 0 BC 5
Study Frequency 10 BB 1
Distribution density for firms with 
“tit for tat” strategy 0.1
4. Results discussion
When the external environment a firm face is relatively stable, the payoff matrix of game is usually unchanged. 
Under such circumstance, the variation of p and the coordination mechanism between firms are considered.
4.1 When P varies
If the distributing density of firms with “tit for tat” strategy is set to rather high degree, such as 0.1, and 
distributed randomly over the entire space, with the rest firms behaving “always competitive”, we can observe the 
visual evolution process of firms comprising clusters with the help of Java swarm.
step 1                          step 11
step 38                      step 68
Figure 2. Industrial Clusters’ evolution (p=0.10)
From figure 2 we learn that many small groups of firms with “tit for tat” strategy appear and fast grow in 
different locations simultaneously, eating the white area gradually and occupying the entire space at last. “Tit for 
tat” strategy wins, which indicates the industrial cluster grows.
With other conditions unchanged, we reset the density to 0.01, much lower than previous. The firms with “tit for 
tat” strategy in this circumstance have scarce probability to meet together. As the figure 2 shows, the evolution of 
the industrial cluster is single-cored, and with much slower growing rate than the one with density 0.1. Several 
values of p lower than 0.01 are also put into simulation, but the evolution process doesn’t happen.
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step 1                      step 35
step 100                step 330
Figure 3. Industrial Clusters’ evolution (density 0.01)
We can learn from above experiments that the evolution and growth of an industrial cluster requires that two 
firms with similar strategy be close enough to each other, then interactions may happen, the evolution starts as a 
result. In this sense, the geographical proximity matters.
It must be particularly noted that the above results are available all under an implicit assumption that there is a 
kind of interaction coordination mechanism at working during the process of group gaming. Because all the firms in 
question are assumed to be self-interested, this assumption may lead to a serious situation, that is, the endless 
retaliation, when two firms with “tit for tat” strategy meet together, and one of them takes “competitive” behavior,  
probably only by a minor mistake.  Without help, they will hurt each other in turn repeatedly when the game goes 
on , and can hardly break out of tragedy by themselves.
4.2 When interaction coordination mechanism doesn’t exist
This time we remove the interaction coordination mechanism in the simulation process, and surprisingly, we find 
that the evolution of industrial clusters is “locked-in” after certain steps, with growth stopped, even with a high 
value of p.
Figure 4. Industrial Clusters’ evolution without coordination mechanism (p=0.1)
Apparently, there is a deeply rooted inconsistency between the interests of the firms and cluster as a whole. The 
evolution of an industrial cluster can not move on without a compromise, which constitutes of constraints for the 
evolution of an industrial cluster.
5. Conclusion
The results shed a light on the conditions that the evolution of industrial clusters requires in terms of swarm 
simulation,. It confirms that the critical role that geographical proximity plays in the process of industrial clusters’
evolution. It further indicates that certain mechanisms of coordination between firms are in most cases indispensable. 
Such mechanisms may appear in social bonding, such as social relationships, culture, or traditional customs, which 
can reduce the opportunist behaviors. In the case where the social bonding is weak, government interventions are of 
greater significance. In most cases, both factors work together.
These discussions may have profound implications for practitioners with some limitations. First, if the space we 
present is heterogeneous  instead of homogeneous, the outcomes and their explanations may be much more complex.  
The strategies proposed in this paper are only two, and quite simple as well. If we take into account the bigger 
number than two strategies with more advanced and intelligence, it will be more like the realistic situation. Besides, 
government may adopt many different ways to influence the behaviors of firms, its effects will be more subtle. 
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